One update root.
Morana updates will be authenticated by TUF and by nothing else. That root is not live yet — so today there is no signed build to verify, and the only distribution we can stand behind is source you build yourself.
There is no signed release channel yet
We would rather say this plainly than hand out a verification step that proves less than it appears to.
TUF, and no second root
This page previously published a minisign signing key and asked you to pin it. We removed it. A second root of trust does not add security — an attacker attacks whichever root is weaker, so the weaker one silently becomes the security of the whole system. A lone online signing key is the weaker one: no signing threshold, no expiry, no rotation path, and no protection against being served an old release instead of the current one.
TUF makes those properties structural rather than optional: separate roles, a threshold of keys per role, metadata that expires so a stalled mirror is detected, and explicit rollback protection. When the Morana updater lands, this page will carry the TUF root metadata and the steps to pin it — one root, described in one place.
What you can actually verify today
Source you compile yourself. Clone over HTTPS, read the diff if you care to, and build:
git clone https://github.com/Morana-Network/morana-wallet-rs
cd morana-wallet-rs
git log --oneline -5 # what you are about to build
cargo build --releaseThis is a testnet. The coins have no value, so the realistic risk of a malicious build is your machine, not your money — but that is reason enough to compile it yourself.